The Palestinians Need a King

A Stability Agenda for the Middle East

A map of the Middle East following the monarchist solution to the Israel–Palestinian conflict. Ideally, the number of kingdoms in the region will further increase over time (eg, via the restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty to Iran’s Peacock Throne). Source: MapChart

When he announced his Freedom Agenda in 2003, President George W. Bush declared that “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe — because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.” In his zeal for democracy, Bush urged the Palestinian Authority (PA) to hold parliamentary elections after Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2006. Fatah, the PA’s ruling party, actually requested that the US ask Israel to block the elections. They were afraid—rightly, as it turns out—of a Hamas victory. But per the Freedom Agenda, Bush wanted elections to proceed, even with the participation of parties—Hamas and Islamic Jihad—that rejected democracy. Consequently, Hamas won a plurality of the votes and a convincing majority of the seats. The collapse of a Palestinian unity government was followed by civil war, Fatah’s expulsion from Gaza, the imposition of an Islamist dictatorship, rocket attacks on Israel, an Israeli blockade in response, and, ultimately, the October 7 massacre and regional war.

Thus among the Palestinians, liberty—at least in the attenuated form of one-time elections—was purchased at the expense of stability. In Iraq and Libya, the ouster of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi resulted in power vacuums filled by warring tribes, feckless kleptocrats, and malicious foreign actors. Even Tunisia, the one democratic success story to emerge from the 2011 Arab Spring, has devolved into a de facto dictatorship and faces economic collapse. The most peaceful and prosperous countries in the Arab world are not democracies, but rather monarchies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Of course, oil wealth is a major factor behind Gulf Arab success, but it’s not the only one. The second-largest oil producer in the Middle East is the semi–failed state of Iraq. Meanwhile, the kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco have achieved stability without major oil reserves. On its own, monarchy obviously doesn’t guarantee national success. After all, Iraq and Libya both had kings of their own before they were toppled. But on balance, monarchy has a better track record in the Arab world than democracy.

Instead of Bush’s Freedom Agenda, a US sobered by failed geopolitical adventurism should pursue a Stability Agenda. In the Middle East, that means not blindly encouraging the spread of democracy as a universal panacea, but rather supporting sometimes unattractive (to the West) but effective monarchies. Perhaps over time, the absolutist Saudi royal family will assume a figurehead role akin to the Windsors in Great Britain. Perhaps, but it’s not in America’s interest to tip the scales and exchange autocracy for chaos. John Adams wrote that “Liberty can no more exist without virtue and independence, than the body can live and move without a soul.” It is for the Arabs alone to develop, or not to develop, the civic virtues that make democracy possible. In the meantime, who are we to say that it’s better being a poor and vulnerable citizen of a nominal republic, than a wealthy and secure subject of a sheikh? For the West to force elections that result in an Islamist government, which in turn abolishes elections and turns against the West, is both politically foolish and ultimately anti-democratic.

Monarchy Is the Answer

That brings us back to the Palestinians. In 1967, Israel conquered the West Bank (formally under Jordanian rule) and Gaza (formerly under Egyptian rule) as a result of an Arab-initiated war. Thus Israel now exercises varying levels of control over around 5.5 million non-citizen Palestinians, though the majority have either autonomy via the PA or, formerly, de facto self-rule under Hamas. From a common Israeli perspective, if the Palestinians were granted citizenship, they would seek to destroy the state from within. But if they were granted independence instead, they would seek to destroy Israel from without. The October 7 massacre, which followed Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza, would seem to prove the dangers of Palestinian independence; especially since, unlike Gaza, the West Bank overlooks Israel’s major population centers. And opinion polling of Palestinians, which shows plurality support for Hamas—an organization committed to Israel’s destruction—would seem to prove the dangers of granting them citizenship. For many Westerners, democracy is seen as an unabashed good. But in the Holy Land, democracy in a single state would likely lead to civil war, while democracy in two states could very well lead to war between them.¹ Yet the status quo itself is one of ever-simmering hostilities that have erupted into full-blown war.

Perhaps the answer to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, then, lies not in more democracy, but in more monarchy. Saudi analyst Ali Shihabi has proposed just such a solution via the Hashemite Kingdom of Palestine, which would include Jordan, Gaza, and the West Bank.² Per Shihabi, Israeli security concerns would be assuaged by Hashemite governance, since Jordan has an established track record of maintaining peace. Palestinians elsewhere in the Arab world could become citizens of the newly expanded kingdom, while also gaining residency rights in their current countries, thus solving the Palestinian “refugee” issue (more accurately termed “descendant of refugee” issue). Shihabi notes that Jordanians and Palestinians are both Sunni Arabs, so their merger in a single state would not result in the inevitable ethnosectarian conflict of a binational Jewish/Arab state. Other pertinent details, unmentioned by Shihabi, include that Jordan was initially part of the 1920 British Mandate for Palestine, so has a historical claim to the name³; that Jordan ruled the West Bank from 1948 to 1967, so the political arrangement is not unprecedented; and that over half of Jordanians are of Palestinian descent already, so the demographic change would be far from radical.⁴ Jordan and Palestine also have almost the exact same (British-designed) flag, so the aesthetic transition would be seamless.

Flags of Jordan (left) and Palestine (right), two very distinct and unique countries. Source: Crossed Flag Pins

Make Jordan Greater Palestine Again

On the surface, the Hashemite Kingdom of Palestine solution would seem to mirror the “Jordan is Palestine” argument of Israeli irredentists. But the settler movement wants Israel to annex the West Bank, not merge it with Jordan. The rub is that formally seizing Arab-majority territory also means formally assuming sovereignty over a large, hostile population. The most radical Kahanists would like to expel the Arabs to Jordan (which they consider the de facto Palestinian state). But doing so would require the (implausible) acquiescence of Jordan⁵ and irreparably damage not just Israel’s relationship with moderate Arab states, but with the United States, the broader West, and much of diaspora Jewry. It would also fracture Israeli society itself and risk an internal Arab uprising. Yet without expulsion, a Greater Israel would face inevitable external and internal pressure to grant citizenship to all Palestinians, which would likely result in state collapse.⁶ The template here is Yugoslavia in the 1990s: ethnic cleansing followed by territorial partition. So why not skip the ethnic cleansing and move straight to partition?

The Hashemite Kingdom of Palestine option addresses an immediate Israeli objection: that a Palestinian state would pose an existential threat. Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994 and—even amidst tensions over the war in Gaza—helped shoot down Iranian rockets aimed at the Jewish state in April 2024. When seven Israeli girls were killed by a Jordanian policeman in 1997, then-King Hussein paid the families a shiva visit and begged for forgiveness.⁷ By comparison, the PA pays stipends to the families of terrorists who murder Israelis. Who would you rather have as a neighbor? Jordan is also an ally of the US and home to an American military presence. If the state were to be enlarged and renamed Palestine, the US could help ensure that its pro-Western, pro-peace orientation continued. Additionally, the Hashemites are already custodians of Jerusalem’s Muslim and Christian holy sites, so could be trusted to ease religious tensions. As in previous negotiations, land swaps could ensure that contiguous Jewish settlements in the West Bank are formally joined to Israel, with the new Kingdom of Palestine gaining equivalent territory. Most remaining Jewish settlers would likely be repatriated to Israel, but some could conceivably choose to become Palestinian citizens, given that they would be joining a functional state.⁸

Jordan itself would face security risks by taking over the West Bank and Gaza. After all, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) sought to overthrow its monarchy in 1970. But Western and Gulf support (Shihabi is a confidant of the Saudi crown prince, so his views presumably have royal legitimacy) could help ensure the peaceful expansion of the kingdom. Jordan formally renounced its claims to the West Bank in 1988, recognizing the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." But over the ensuing three-plus decades, the PLO has failed to achieve statehood, or simply peace and prosperity, for the Palestinians. Were the Hashemite Kingdom of Palestine to be formally proposed—especially as the end-goal of a regional initiative to rebuild Gaza—it could win substantial Palestinian support.⁹ While the Palestinians would be giving up their fantasy of a state that includes all of modern Israel, they would gain an actual state that is over four times larger. As for Jordan, what king doesn’t want more land (including beachside property¹⁰) and subjects, especially if sweetened with major foreign investment?¹¹ The name Jordan was imposed by the British and is of no historical value.¹² By gaining the title King of Palestine instead, Abdullah II would inherit all of the esteem that the Palestinian cause has garnered in the Arab and Muslim worlds. And the Palestinians would get the state that they so royally deserve.

1. The germane Israeli fear is not of a Palestinian state with a regular army that Israel could easily defeat, but of an internationally legitimized, Iranian-backed terror base next door. The models here are Gaza, a statelet run by a terror group, and Lebanon, a failed state run roughshod over by a terror group (at least prior to Israel’s anti-Hezbollah campaign).

2. Jordanian-Palestinian billionaire Hasan Ismaik has proposed a similar solution, though his version of the unified state would be called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Palestine. Regardless of exact nomenclature, given the quasi-religious resonance that “Palestine” has attained, Arabs likely need to see the name in big, bold letters on a map before there can be any hope of serious regional conciliation.

3. Going further back in history, the Byzantine provinces of Palaestina Secunda and Palaestina Tertia extended into what is now Jordan. Moreover, the name Palestine (imposed after Rome’s victory over Judean rebels) is likely derived from Philistia, the homeland of the Philistines, in roughly today’s Gaza Strip—which would be part of any proposed Palestinian state. Although not all of maximal Palestine would form part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Palestine, the Palestinians could take solace that much of Judea (origin of the ethnonym “Jews,” centered in today’s West Bank) would not be part of Israel, either.

4. Jordan’s current population is 11.5 million. By adding the West Bank and Gaza to the Hashemite Kingdom, its total population would be 17 million, of whom 32.5% would live in Israel’s former Palestinian Territories (which could henceforth be renamed West Palestine). As regards representation, Ian Bremmer has discussed the possibility of a confederation with two legislative assemblies: one for the West Bank and one for the East Bank. The monarch, of course, would have ultimate authority.

5. Notably, article 2.6 of Israel’s peace treaty with Jordan states that “within their control, involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the security of either Party should not be permitted.”

6. If Israel formally incorporated the West Bank and Gaza, including their people, it would have a slight Arab majority. That majority could attempt to further tip the demographic balance by enacting a “right of return” for Palestinians elsewhere and ultimately expelling “settler-colonialist” Jews. Without opposition, the result would be an ethnically cleansed single Arab state of Palestine. But, of course, there would be Jewish opposition and almost certain bloodshed.

David Friedman, former US Ambassador to Israel, argues that Israel should annex the West Bank and grant its Palestinians “permanent resident” status only. But as

Blake Flayton

writes, “Leaving aside the inevitable cascade of international condemnation and sanctions such a solution would provoke, the sheer amount of terror unleashed on Israeli population centers in its aftermath would break the soul of the country within weeks.”

7. A man ahead of his time, King Hussein proposed a Jordanian–Palestinian federation (the “United Arab Kingdom”) back in 1972.

8. Menachem Froman, chief rabbi of the Israeli settlement of Tekoa, advocated for Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, but for Jewish settlers to remain as Palestinian citizens. On the Arab side, the above-mentioned Ismaik has suggested that Jewish Palestinians could be guaranteed representation in the Hashemite parliament. So while most settlers would surely prefer to live under Israeli sovereignty out of well-founded fear of massacres, their expulsion isn’t a sine qua non of partition.

9. According to a 2019 survey, three-quarters of West Bank Palestinians and two-thirds of Gazans approved of Jordan’s king. Only a small minority supported union with Jordan, but a 2016 survey showed plurality support for a “confederation on the basis of two states.” Historically, Yasser Arafat also supported a Palestinian confederation with Jordan: “We are, after all, twin brothers, Palestine and Jordan.” Today, the Abraham Accords have made a regional solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict more feasible, while October 7 and the war in Gaza have made it more urgent.

10. The rebuilding and deradicalization of Gaza would undoubtedly be costly, but would also give the Hashemites access to the Mediterranean and even a potential tourist destination.

11. Jordan has formally opposed reclaiming the West Bank, but internal debates within the kingdom are more complex. For example, per Foreign Policy: “in 2012, former Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal delivered a speech in the West Bank city of Nablus and argued that the West Bank legally belonged to Jordan, because the kingdom never formally abandoned sovereignty claims.”

12. To be precise, the British imposed the name Transjordan (“beyond the Jordan river”). Transjordan only became Jordan in 1949 to reflect the Hashemite conquest of the West Bank (ie, Cisjordan, “on this side of the Jordan river”). So the name Jordan itself implies a territorial claim to the West Bank.