Do you think a “Jordanian option” with almost all of the West Bank—and perhaps Gaza—moving back under Jordanian sovereignty would be politically palatable in Israel? No more dreams of annexation? No more Jordan Valley security perimeter?
Or does Israel annex large portions of the territory of Area C, including the Jordan valley, with the Palestinians to be annexed in Areas A & B into Jordanian “settlements”?
The Palestinian side would probably insist on more formal “custodianship” of the Haram al-Sharif area as under the Waqf.
Yes, I think it would be if security concerns were adequately addressed. The model here should be Israel's withdrawal from Sinai, not the disengagement from Gaza. The critical distinction is that, in the case of Sinai, Israel was ceding territory to a stable state actor interested in (and capable of) enforcing peace. Israelis are understandably skeptical that a Palestinian government could ever fulfill that role. But Israel already has a peace agreement with Jordan that has stood the test of time. Moreover, the West Bank and Gaza could be accorded a similar status to Sinai in terms of demilitarization and international monitoring. Add in the prospect of an expanded Abraham Accords with Saudi Arabia and other countries, and a visionary leader could make the case to Israel's non-zealot majority.
To make this arrangement plausible, you'd need sufficient Jordanian and Palestinian buy-in, which is why the idea of isolated Jordanian "settlements" wouldn't work. All sides need to feel that they're gaining something. Israel would achieve secure borders, Jordan would gain more territory, and the Palestinians would have their state. For precedent, look to the 1987 Peres–Hussein London Agreement, one of the great missed opportunities of the conflict (https://www.timesofisrael.com/missed-opportunity-the-1987-peres-hussein-peace-deal-that-wasnt/). The opportunity for confederation is more ripe today than in 1987, because the alternatives (the Oslo Accords, unilateral Israeli disengagement, Israel's destruction via an Iranian-backed "ring of fire") have demonstrably failed, while other regional players (most notably MBS) are eager for a solution that would lead to regional stability.
The question in my mind is the feasibility based on current domestic politics of Israel, not what is theoretically feasible.
The TOI article, for example, presents an interview with a former Shimon Peres aide, presumably some Laborite, laying the failure of the 1987 London agreement at the feet of Likud and Yitzhak Shamir, who allegedly rejected it. Yet that was 1987–two intifadas and an Oct 7th ago-Likud today is a comparatively moderate “centrist” faction in today’s Israeli politics and labor is all but non-existent.
It seems to me (an outsider) that any similar proposal today on the table would be more likely to be rejected than it was in 1980’s, not less likely.
Is it feasible based on Israel's current domestic politics? Perhaps not. But the Israeli right has no serious long-term vision for resolving the Palestinian issue. Netanyahu's policy of keeping the Palestinians divided and kicking the can down the road has proven untenable, while Smotrich and his ilk offer annexationist fantasies that would amount to Israel's demographic suicide and deepen its international isolation. Meanwhile, the left has nothing new to offer, while the Oslo framework has been discredited in the eyes of most Israelis.
The opportunity is ripe, then, for bold and visionary thinking. That's especially the case since the "day after" question for Gaza is pressing, while the Abraham Accords have opened the door for a truly regional solution. Of course, you'd need a strong leader able to make the case, but I'm not so pessimistic as to believe the future will be a mere continuation of past failures.
Do you think a “Jordanian option” with almost all of the West Bank—and perhaps Gaza—moving back under Jordanian sovereignty would be politically palatable in Israel? No more dreams of annexation? No more Jordan Valley security perimeter?
Or does Israel annex large portions of the territory of Area C, including the Jordan valley, with the Palestinians to be annexed in Areas A & B into Jordanian “settlements”?
The Palestinian side would probably insist on more formal “custodianship” of the Haram al-Sharif area as under the Waqf.
Yes, I think it would be if security concerns were adequately addressed. The model here should be Israel's withdrawal from Sinai, not the disengagement from Gaza. The critical distinction is that, in the case of Sinai, Israel was ceding territory to a stable state actor interested in (and capable of) enforcing peace. Israelis are understandably skeptical that a Palestinian government could ever fulfill that role. But Israel already has a peace agreement with Jordan that has stood the test of time. Moreover, the West Bank and Gaza could be accorded a similar status to Sinai in terms of demilitarization and international monitoring. Add in the prospect of an expanded Abraham Accords with Saudi Arabia and other countries, and a visionary leader could make the case to Israel's non-zealot majority.
To make this arrangement plausible, you'd need sufficient Jordanian and Palestinian buy-in, which is why the idea of isolated Jordanian "settlements" wouldn't work. All sides need to feel that they're gaining something. Israel would achieve secure borders, Jordan would gain more territory, and the Palestinians would have their state. For precedent, look to the 1987 Peres–Hussein London Agreement, one of the great missed opportunities of the conflict (https://www.timesofisrael.com/missed-opportunity-the-1987-peres-hussein-peace-deal-that-wasnt/). The opportunity for confederation is more ripe today than in 1987, because the alternatives (the Oslo Accords, unilateral Israeli disengagement, Israel's destruction via an Iranian-backed "ring of fire") have demonstrably failed, while other regional players (most notably MBS) are eager for a solution that would lead to regional stability.
The question in my mind is the feasibility based on current domestic politics of Israel, not what is theoretically feasible.
The TOI article, for example, presents an interview with a former Shimon Peres aide, presumably some Laborite, laying the failure of the 1987 London agreement at the feet of Likud and Yitzhak Shamir, who allegedly rejected it. Yet that was 1987–two intifadas and an Oct 7th ago-Likud today is a comparatively moderate “centrist” faction in today’s Israeli politics and labor is all but non-existent.
It seems to me (an outsider) that any similar proposal today on the table would be more likely to be rejected than it was in 1980’s, not less likely.
Is it feasible based on Israel's current domestic politics? Perhaps not. But the Israeli right has no serious long-term vision for resolving the Palestinian issue. Netanyahu's policy of keeping the Palestinians divided and kicking the can down the road has proven untenable, while Smotrich and his ilk offer annexationist fantasies that would amount to Israel's demographic suicide and deepen its international isolation. Meanwhile, the left has nothing new to offer, while the Oslo framework has been discredited in the eyes of most Israelis.
The opportunity is ripe, then, for bold and visionary thinking. That's especially the case since the "day after" question for Gaza is pressing, while the Abraham Accords have opened the door for a truly regional solution. Of course, you'd need a strong leader able to make the case, but I'm not so pessimistic as to believe the future will be a mere continuation of past failures.