Very interesting. I thought it worth mentioning that more Lebanese people live in Brazil than Lebanon. I can't think of any other example of a diasporic population in one country that outnumbers its home country's population - probably not a good sign of the long-term functionality of said country.
If you count diaspora and descendants than the UK and Ireland have much larger diasporas than home populations. But yes, it is not a good sign for Lebanon unfortunately.
Right, but those are spread across multiple countries. There are (e.g.) more Jewish people outside of Israel than within Israel, but they aren't all concentrated in a single country. What makes this such a special case is that Brazil *alone* has more Lebanese people than Lebanon.
Sorry to be annoying but the USA alone has more Irish people than Ireland itself and there are more than double Irish Americans than any other Irish diaspora group, so while it is a bad sign that Lebanese people are having to leave, neither their large diaspora, nor the concentration of their diaspora are unique.
That Irish immigration all occurred when Ireland was basically a failed state- a modern Lebanon. The resurgence of Ireland as a functioning nation could serve as a model for failed states today.
Wikipedia tells me the main migration wave occured from the 1890s to the 1930s. before Lebanon existed as a country. I don't know if that's right, but if it is, it deflates any conclusion you wold draw about Lebanon the state.
Yes, many Lebanese Christians left the region before modern Lebanon existed. But the factors that caused them to leave included sectarian conflict and religious discrimination by the ruling Ottoman Empire. That mass migration continued after the state was formed does tell us something about modern Lebanon: namely, that it failed in its original purpose to provide a safe haven for the Maronites (or a safe haven for anyone, really).
Frankly, one wonders whether the best move after the end of WWI would have been to simply turn the Christian--and possibly Druze--parts of Lebanon and Syria into an overseas department of France, similar to northern Algeria, except much more sustainable due to greater religious similarities and a much smaller total population. Would that have been such a bad outcome for the Christian--and possibly Druze--Lebanese?
The rest of Lebanon could have been annexed to Syria.
You can't impose a state on a people who don't want one. The Palestinians are not interested in their own state, but rather in the destruction of Israel. Therefore, the two-state solution is impossible. I don't know enough about Lebanon's history to say whether Muslims there would have been obsessed with destroying the Christian state instead of establishing their own if a homogeneous Christian state had been created.
You might be able to impose a state on a people who don't want one, if you have strong enough international backing. Saudi Arabia and like-minded Gulf Arab countries are in favor of a two-state solution, largely because they desire military and economic ties with Israel but don't want to anger their own people by "abandoning" the Palestinians. Given Israeli, American, and Saudi muscle and money, plus the diminishment (ideally, destruction) of Hamas, the Palestinians could be strong-armed into limiting their ambitions.
As for an explicitly Christian Lebanon, it would certainly have angered Islamists as a reversion to infidels of what was once part of Dar al-Islam. On the other hand, Lebanon, unlike Israel, is not considered sacred Muslim land, so there would have been less emotional valence to the issue. Plus, Christians were already a majority in parts of Lebanon and Syria. The borders would just need to have been drawn to reflect demographic reality, instead of pluralist fantasy.
How can you establish a state for someone who doesn't want one? You expect them to build a school, they'll build a missile warehouse. You expect them to establish water infrastructure, they'll take the pipes for rockets. You expect them to democratically elect someone who will grow the economy or legislate good laws, they'll elect whoever promises to kill more Jews.
I suggest you give a little less respect to theory and a little more respect to empirical reality.
That assumes Palestinians are immediately granted a state with no outside involvement or Israeli say. At this point, any realistic two-state scenario envisions a transition period that includes foreign investment and oversight (eg, involving Gulf countries rebuilding Gaza) before gradually increased autonomy that would include demilitarization.
As for empirical reality, how about the demographic fact that there are a roughly equal number of Arabs and Jews in the Holy Land? And that the Haredim, who largely don’t serve in the army, are projected to become an increasingly large share of Israel’s Jewish population? Is permanent Israeli control of the Arab-majority Gaza and West Bank feasible? The Maronites thought they could ensure permanent Christian control of a Muslim-majority country and present-day Lebanon is the result.
Thanks. I read the piece, and to be clear, my argument for two states is not based on liberal-humanist messianism, but on Israel's self-interest. Your article also didn't address the demographic question. It's feasible for mammoth Russia to conquer and absorb Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Israelis lack the same demographic heft and are currently unable or unwilling to either assimilate the Palestinian Arabs or separate from them. Thus a "managed conflict" that is unsustainable in the long run (especially as Israel becomes increasingly Haredi).
Regarding American politics, I don't accept the premise that Republicans "will support Israel in any situation against Muslim barbarism, regardless of the imaginary rules of the international community." There is a strong and growing isolationist wing of the Republican Party. So far, Israel has largely had a carve-out because of Evangelical support, but the Evangelicals are declining demographically and being supplanted by "cultural Christians" who are wary of involvement in any foreign conflict (think Tucker Carlson). The American right can quite easily "oppose Muslim barbarism" but also oppose foreign entanglements in the Middle East.
In terms of the Democrats, while there is undoubtedly a progressive wing that is committed to hating Israel regardless of its actions, it is not the majority. The Democrats were more pro-Israel when Israel was seen as actively seeking a two-state solution in the 90s. On a larger historical scale, the left in general was more pro-Zionist before Israel took control of the West Bank and Gaza. So it is unduly fatalistic to assume that Israeli actions can have no impact on left-wing sentiment. Since Israel's survival and success depend on American support, it is not in Israel's interest to give up on one of its major political parties.
As for the argument that a Palestinian state "will be a playground for Iran and its axis," here is where one of the greatest benefits of a two-state solution comes into play: the possibility of closer ties with the Sunni Arab world (especially Saudi Arabia). A Palestinian state could become a de facto protectorate of the Gulf Arabs, who are anti-Iranian and anti-Muslim Brotherhood. A political solution would work to break apart the unnatural alliance between Shi'ite Iran and the Sunni Palestinians, helping to solidify a Sunni/Jewish vs. Shi'ite regional realignment. I've written more about this at https://1000yearview.substack.com/p/pax-semitica
Jordan washed its hands of the West Bank, so did Egypt of Gaza. A confederation of the disputed territories in the West Bank and Jordan would make economic and political sense. Jordanians are practical people and can be negotiated with, as opposed to Fatah. As for Gaza, it was always historically linked to Northern Sinai, which lacks the population that Gaza has. Unfortunately, with Egypt's own problems with the Muslim Brotherhood, they want nothing with their Hamas cousins ...
Why is it always "a coalition of Muslims and leftists", though? The Muslims as far as I am aware don't give a shit about socialism, so why do the leftists always look at the Muslim irredentists and go "these are our guys"?
Very clear and solid piece. But while we're on the subject, should Syria be a country? Obviously the idea of Syria as a nation runs very deep historically, back to biblical times. But Turkey and Saudi Arabia tried to tear it up in only the past few years, and it's still in shreds. Ruled by a Shia minority hated by a Sunni majority. Much of the land controlled by enemies of the Damascus regime. Hell, even America has troops there and we just killed a bunch of Syrians. The Kurds and the Turks struggle for a big slice of Syria.
Syria is actually ruled by the Alawites, an ethnoreligious group who now market themselves as a Shi'ite sect but have traditionally been considered non-Muslim heretics (for example, they believe in reincarnation and a divine trinity, drink alcohol, and don't keep halal). In the 1920s, the French created an autonomous Alawite State on Syria's Mediterranean coast, where they are demographically concentrated. Had the Assad government lost the Syrian Civil War, their "Plan B" would have been to retreat to their Alawite stronghold and possibly re-establish their separate state.
The chaos and bloodshed in Syria reflect the broader collapse of pan-Arabism in the region (Syria's ruling Ba'ath party is nominally pan-Arabist), with sect/tribe proving a more enduring marker of identity. Unlike Lebanon (but like Iraq), Syria is an ersatz country that was able to maintain temporary cohesion via dictatorship. Establishing a separate Alawite State, plus a separate Kurdistan (to include Kurdish regions beyond Syria), would have been better for all parties.
In such a scenario, rump Syria in the interior would have suffered a lot due to it being landlocked, no? Or would trade and economic ties with Turkey have compensated for this?
BTW, interesting that Pan-Europeanism fared much, much better than Pan-Arabism did.
If Lebanon had been created as a more homogeneously Christian state, what is now southern Lebanon could have been part of Syria, which would have given the country access to the Mediterranean. The Shi'ites there now would then have become a smaller, more manageable minority within a predominantly Sunni state.
As for pan-Europeanism, it only succeeded (and even then, has its skeptics) after two world wars plus ethnic cleansing and population transfers. Notably, in interwar Eastern Europe, Jews and ethnic Germans were the two largest minority groups. The Jews were killed, with the survivors mostly driven to Israel, while the Volksdeutsche served as a pretext for Nazi wars of conquest and were subsequently expelled.
Moreover, religion is a much more salient marker of identity in the Middle East than it is in modern Europe, where nationalism has deeper roots. Consider how Germany was able to forge a nation out of Protestants and Catholics (and even, for a time, Jews), whereas Sunnis and Shi'ites form rival tribes. Or consider the number of ethnoreligions in the Middle East: not just Jews but also Druze, Alawites, and a number of Christian groups (eg, Maronites, Assyrians, Copts).
In this scenario, could the Lebanese Shi’ites have allied with the Alawites to rule over Syria together? Or would there have been too much mutual distrust?
I also wonder if a European Union could have been possible with a less bloody history—without one or both World Wars, or had Germany won WWI. What do you think?
As for Middle Eastern Christians, their numbers aren’t all that large outside of Lebanon. No more than 10% in any other country, I would think? But as for Sunnis and Shi’ites, what about creating exclusively Sunni and Shi’a EU-like unions, separately?
By my calculations, over 60% of Lebanon's post-independence history is characterized by civil war, foreign occupation, and/or state failure. Even without Hezbollah, the country's demographics are conducive to chronic dysfunction.
I think the _only_ lesson Lebanon gives is "don't become the breeding ground for an Iran-backed militia" (or, more broadly, for any militia backed by an authoritarian power and/or Islamist teachings). Same lesson the entire Central Africa, Syria, Gaza, and Iraq teach (and Afghanistan if you don't enforce the backing power part). It is not about demographics, per se. Lebanon 🇱🇧 is a powerful project, and it could rise again once Hesbollah and, more broadly, Iran are shown their way out.
To avoid becoming a breeding ground for an Iran-backed militia, it helps to have a cohesive state. To have a cohesive state, it helps to have demographics conducive to stability. Lebanon was previously occupied by Syria, so Iran is not the entirety of its problem. The weakness of the Lebanese state, which is downstream of demographics, is what has invited foreign interference.
There is almost always _some_ national conflict to exploit. See Georgia: I don't think you could plausibly argue that its demographics, with 70% Georgians in 1989 census (later censuses unfortunately exclude the uncontrolled territories, which leads to a heightened percentage of Georgians and strongly lowered percentages of Abkhazians and Ossetians), was ever that faulty.
But Georgia was a relatively stable country before Russian interference. And, outside of Russian-occupied territory, it remains a functional state. By contrast, the Lebanese civil war preceded the formation of Hezbollah. And Lebanon doesn't just have breakaway regions; it's a failed state in its totality.
You paint it as if its being failed state was forewritten in 1948 because of the demographics. Its history is no evidence for this, to say the least. It had a civil war - sure, what country in non-Soviet Asia didn't have a civil war in the last century? (Turkey doesn't count.) Without Iran's and Israel's interference, we simply don't know what would happen, and I think there's a strong case we wouldn't have seen a failed state.
Many 20th-century Asian civil conflicts were ideological, pitting communists against nationalists (eg, in China, Korea, Vietnam). Though these conflicts involved foreign interference, the end result was generally a stable, if not always democratic, state. Even North Korea is internally stable, despite being a totalitarian dystopia. The ultimate cause of the Lebanese Civil War was sectarian demographics, and it remains a failed state because those underlying sectarian demographics remain. Notably, nearby Syria and Iraq are also dysfunctional countries subject to foreign interference and riven by sectarian demographics.
Very interesting. I thought it worth mentioning that more Lebanese people live in Brazil than Lebanon. I can't think of any other example of a diasporic population in one country that outnumbers its home country's population - probably not a good sign of the long-term functionality of said country.
If you count diaspora and descendants than the UK and Ireland have much larger diasporas than home populations. But yes, it is not a good sign for Lebanon unfortunately.
There are also about as much Norwegian Americans as there are Norwegian Norwegians. Still I'm fairly positive for the prospects of Norwegian stability
Yep, I am also positive about UK and Ireland stability as well.
Right, but those are spread across multiple countries. There are (e.g.) more Jewish people outside of Israel than within Israel, but they aren't all concentrated in a single country. What makes this such a special case is that Brazil *alone* has more Lebanese people than Lebanon.
Sorry to be annoying but the USA alone has more Irish people than Ireland itself and there are more than double Irish Americans than any other Irish diaspora group, so while it is a bad sign that Lebanese people are having to leave, neither their large diaspora, nor the concentration of their diaspora are unique.
Not annoying at all - it's always good to know more things, and my comments could have used more details.
That Irish immigration all occurred when Ireland was basically a failed state- a modern Lebanon. The resurgence of Ireland as a functioning nation could serve as a model for failed states today.
Wikipedia tells me the main migration wave occured from the 1890s to the 1930s. before Lebanon existed as a country. I don't know if that's right, but if it is, it deflates any conclusion you wold draw about Lebanon the state.
Yes, many Lebanese Christians left the region before modern Lebanon existed. But the factors that caused them to leave included sectarian conflict and religious discrimination by the ruling Ottoman Empire. That mass migration continued after the state was formed does tell us something about modern Lebanon: namely, that it failed in its original purpose to provide a safe haven for the Maronites (or a safe haven for anyone, really).
Lebanon was formed gradually about the time the migration wave ended.
Frankly, one wonders whether the best move after the end of WWI would have been to simply turn the Christian--and possibly Druze--parts of Lebanon and Syria into an overseas department of France, similar to northern Algeria, except much more sustainable due to greater religious similarities and a much smaller total population. Would that have been such a bad outcome for the Christian--and possibly Druze--Lebanese?
The rest of Lebanon could have been annexed to Syria.
You can't impose a state on a people who don't want one. The Palestinians are not interested in their own state, but rather in the destruction of Israel. Therefore, the two-state solution is impossible. I don't know enough about Lebanon's history to say whether Muslims there would have been obsessed with destroying the Christian state instead of establishing their own if a homogeneous Christian state had been created.
You might be able to impose a state on a people who don't want one, if you have strong enough international backing. Saudi Arabia and like-minded Gulf Arab countries are in favor of a two-state solution, largely because they desire military and economic ties with Israel but don't want to anger their own people by "abandoning" the Palestinians. Given Israeli, American, and Saudi muscle and money, plus the diminishment (ideally, destruction) of Hamas, the Palestinians could be strong-armed into limiting their ambitions.
As for an explicitly Christian Lebanon, it would certainly have angered Islamists as a reversion to infidels of what was once part of Dar al-Islam. On the other hand, Lebanon, unlike Israel, is not considered sacred Muslim land, so there would have been less emotional valence to the issue. Plus, Christians were already a majority in parts of Lebanon and Syria. The borders would just need to have been drawn to reflect demographic reality, instead of pluralist fantasy.
How can you establish a state for someone who doesn't want one? You expect them to build a school, they'll build a missile warehouse. You expect them to establish water infrastructure, they'll take the pipes for rockets. You expect them to democratically elect someone who will grow the economy or legislate good laws, they'll elect whoever promises to kill more Jews.
I suggest you give a little less respect to theory and a little more respect to empirical reality.
That assumes Palestinians are immediately granted a state with no outside involvement or Israeli say. At this point, any realistic two-state scenario envisions a transition period that includes foreign investment and oversight (eg, involving Gulf countries rebuilding Gaza) before gradually increased autonomy that would include demilitarization.
As for empirical reality, how about the demographic fact that there are a roughly equal number of Arabs and Jews in the Holy Land? And that the Haredim, who largely don’t serve in the army, are projected to become an increasingly large share of Israel’s Jewish population? Is permanent Israeli control of the Arab-majority Gaza and West Bank feasible? The Maronites thought they could ensure permanent Christian control of a Muslim-majority country and present-day Lebanon is the result.
https://tamritz.substack.com/p/israelpalestine-after-the-end-of
I tried to discuss your argument
Thanks. I read the piece, and to be clear, my argument for two states is not based on liberal-humanist messianism, but on Israel's self-interest. Your article also didn't address the demographic question. It's feasible for mammoth Russia to conquer and absorb Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Israelis lack the same demographic heft and are currently unable or unwilling to either assimilate the Palestinian Arabs or separate from them. Thus a "managed conflict" that is unsustainable in the long run (especially as Israel becomes increasingly Haredi).
Regarding American politics, I don't accept the premise that Republicans "will support Israel in any situation against Muslim barbarism, regardless of the imaginary rules of the international community." There is a strong and growing isolationist wing of the Republican Party. So far, Israel has largely had a carve-out because of Evangelical support, but the Evangelicals are declining demographically and being supplanted by "cultural Christians" who are wary of involvement in any foreign conflict (think Tucker Carlson). The American right can quite easily "oppose Muslim barbarism" but also oppose foreign entanglements in the Middle East.
In terms of the Democrats, while there is undoubtedly a progressive wing that is committed to hating Israel regardless of its actions, it is not the majority. The Democrats were more pro-Israel when Israel was seen as actively seeking a two-state solution in the 90s. On a larger historical scale, the left in general was more pro-Zionist before Israel took control of the West Bank and Gaza. So it is unduly fatalistic to assume that Israeli actions can have no impact on left-wing sentiment. Since Israel's survival and success depend on American support, it is not in Israel's interest to give up on one of its major political parties.
As for the argument that a Palestinian state "will be a playground for Iran and its axis," here is where one of the greatest benefits of a two-state solution comes into play: the possibility of closer ties with the Sunni Arab world (especially Saudi Arabia). A Palestinian state could become a de facto protectorate of the Gulf Arabs, who are anti-Iranian and anti-Muslim Brotherhood. A political solution would work to break apart the unnatural alliance between Shi'ite Iran and the Sunni Palestinians, helping to solidify a Sunni/Jewish vs. Shi'ite regional realignment. I've written more about this at https://1000yearview.substack.com/p/pax-semitica
Jordan washed its hands of the West Bank, so did Egypt of Gaza. A confederation of the disputed territories in the West Bank and Jordan would make economic and political sense. Jordanians are practical people and can be negotiated with, as opposed to Fatah. As for Gaza, it was always historically linked to Northern Sinai, which lacks the population that Gaza has. Unfortunately, with Egypt's own problems with the Muslim Brotherhood, they want nothing with their Hamas cousins ...
Yes, in theory, the "Jordanian option" (a Jordanian-West Bank confederation) is attractive, especially since Jordan already has a large Palestinian population--and was carved out of British Mandatory Palestine in the first place. A Saudi analyst made an interesting case for a Hashemite Kingdom of Palestine (https://english.alarabiya.net/in-translation/2022/06/08/The-Hashemite-Kingdom-of-Palestine). I've also seen proposals to create a "Greater Gaza" that includes parts of the Sinai (eg, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/460962-a-palestinian-state-in-gaza-sinai-the-real-two-state-solution/). The problem is the lack of broad support by any of the involved parties. Visionary leadership, and a mutual recognition that the status quo is untenable, are needed for any real solution.
Exactly
Why is it always "a coalition of Muslims and leftists", though? The Muslims as far as I am aware don't give a shit about socialism, so why do the leftists always look at the Muslim irredentists and go "these are our guys"?
Very clear and solid piece. But while we're on the subject, should Syria be a country? Obviously the idea of Syria as a nation runs very deep historically, back to biblical times. But Turkey and Saudi Arabia tried to tear it up in only the past few years, and it's still in shreds. Ruled by a Shia minority hated by a Sunni majority. Much of the land controlled by enemies of the Damascus regime. Hell, even America has troops there and we just killed a bunch of Syrians. The Kurds and the Turks struggle for a big slice of Syria.
Syria is actually ruled by the Alawites, an ethnoreligious group who now market themselves as a Shi'ite sect but have traditionally been considered non-Muslim heretics (for example, they believe in reincarnation and a divine trinity, drink alcohol, and don't keep halal). In the 1920s, the French created an autonomous Alawite State on Syria's Mediterranean coast, where they are demographically concentrated. Had the Assad government lost the Syrian Civil War, their "Plan B" would have been to retreat to their Alawite stronghold and possibly re-establish their separate state.
The chaos and bloodshed in Syria reflect the broader collapse of pan-Arabism in the region (Syria's ruling Ba'ath party is nominally pan-Arabist), with sect/tribe proving a more enduring marker of identity. Unlike Lebanon (but like Iraq), Syria is an ersatz country that was able to maintain temporary cohesion via dictatorship. Establishing a separate Alawite State, plus a separate Kurdistan (to include Kurdish regions beyond Syria), would have been better for all parties.
In such a scenario, rump Syria in the interior would have suffered a lot due to it being landlocked, no? Or would trade and economic ties with Turkey have compensated for this?
BTW, interesting that Pan-Europeanism fared much, much better than Pan-Arabism did.
If Lebanon had been created as a more homogeneously Christian state, what is now southern Lebanon could have been part of Syria, which would have given the country access to the Mediterranean. The Shi'ites there now would then have become a smaller, more manageable minority within a predominantly Sunni state.
As for pan-Europeanism, it only succeeded (and even then, has its skeptics) after two world wars plus ethnic cleansing and population transfers. Notably, in interwar Eastern Europe, Jews and ethnic Germans were the two largest minority groups. The Jews were killed, with the survivors mostly driven to Israel, while the Volksdeutsche served as a pretext for Nazi wars of conquest and were subsequently expelled.
Moreover, religion is a much more salient marker of identity in the Middle East than it is in modern Europe, where nationalism has deeper roots. Consider how Germany was able to forge a nation out of Protestants and Catholics (and even, for a time, Jews), whereas Sunnis and Shi'ites form rival tribes. Or consider the number of ethnoreligions in the Middle East: not just Jews but also Druze, Alawites, and a number of Christian groups (eg, Maronites, Assyrians, Copts).
In this scenario, could the Lebanese Shi’ites have allied with the Alawites to rule over Syria together? Or would there have been too much mutual distrust?
I also wonder if a European Union could have been possible with a less bloody history—without one or both World Wars, or had Germany won WWI. What do you think?
As for Middle Eastern Christians, their numbers aren’t all that large outside of Lebanon. No more than 10% in any other country, I would think? But as for Sunnis and Shi’ites, what about creating exclusively Sunni and Shi’a EU-like unions, separately?
If Ottoman Empire chose different allyship in WW1, Pan-Islamist perspectives could have played out very differently.
Yes, the Europeans aren't very interested in killing each other nowadays.
Neither are different Hindu ethnic groups, for that matter.
Lebanon w/o the Hezbollah existed very well and could again.
By my calculations, over 60% of Lebanon's post-independence history is characterized by civil war, foreign occupation, and/or state failure. Even without Hezbollah, the country's demographics are conducive to chronic dysfunction.
I think the _only_ lesson Lebanon gives is "don't become the breeding ground for an Iran-backed militia" (or, more broadly, for any militia backed by an authoritarian power and/or Islamist teachings). Same lesson the entire Central Africa, Syria, Gaza, and Iraq teach (and Afghanistan if you don't enforce the backing power part). It is not about demographics, per se. Lebanon 🇱🇧 is a powerful project, and it could rise again once Hesbollah and, more broadly, Iran are shown their way out.
To avoid becoming a breeding ground for an Iran-backed militia, it helps to have a cohesive state. To have a cohesive state, it helps to have demographics conducive to stability. Lebanon was previously occupied by Syria, so Iran is not the entirety of its problem. The weakness of the Lebanese state, which is downstream of demographics, is what has invited foreign interference.
There is almost always _some_ national conflict to exploit. See Georgia: I don't think you could plausibly argue that its demographics, with 70% Georgians in 1989 census (later censuses unfortunately exclude the uncontrolled territories, which leads to a heightened percentage of Georgians and strongly lowered percentages of Abkhazians and Ossetians), was ever that faulty.
But Georgia was a relatively stable country before Russian interference. And, outside of Russian-occupied territory, it remains a functional state. By contrast, the Lebanese civil war preceded the formation of Hezbollah. And Lebanon doesn't just have breakaway regions; it's a failed state in its totality.
You paint it as if its being failed state was forewritten in 1948 because of the demographics. Its history is no evidence for this, to say the least. It had a civil war - sure, what country in non-Soviet Asia didn't have a civil war in the last century? (Turkey doesn't count.) Without Iran's and Israel's interference, we simply don't know what would happen, and I think there's a strong case we wouldn't have seen a failed state.
Many 20th-century Asian civil conflicts were ideological, pitting communists against nationalists (eg, in China, Korea, Vietnam). Though these conflicts involved foreign interference, the end result was generally a stable, if not always democratic, state. Even North Korea is internally stable, despite being a totalitarian dystopia. The ultimate cause of the Lebanese Civil War was sectarian demographics, and it remains a failed state because those underlying sectarian demographics remain. Notably, nearby Syria and Iraq are also dysfunctional countries subject to foreign interference and riven by sectarian demographics.
Excuse me? Iraq? The 75-80% Arab Iraq?
Seems stuck in dated ethnonationalist views